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With the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the war in Afghanistan and then the 
invasion of Iraq, the word intelligence has become a household term and a catch-all 
expression used on a daily basis by many people within government, the media, and the 
general public alike. Unfortunately, many people seem to misunderstand or misinterpret 
the concept of intelligence. For them, and for anyone else with any degree of interest in 
the world of intelligence, Silent Warfare is undeniably the best starting point for 
understanding the subject, although it was written before the terrorist attacks. 
Abram Shulsky, who wrote the original 1991 edition, and Gary Schmitt, who took part in 
the 1993 re-edition, present a dense and comprehensive treatise aimed at helping us 
understand the intricate world of intelligence – hence the judiciously-chosen title. Now in 
its third edition, this book has incontestably become the best primer on intelligence 
available. Silent Warfare provides us with a guide – virtually a textbook – covering all 
areas from intelligence-gathering to covert action, from intelligence analysis to counter-
intelligence, from the management of intelligence to definitions of that elusive term. The 
reader will greatly enjoy the clear and logical structure of the book and the fact that the 
authors go straight to the point. All chapters are kept relatively short (either 10 or 30 
pages long) and are subdivided for greater clarity. In addition, well-chosen historical 
examples bring relevant and interesting illustrations to the otherwise very academic style 
of the text. 
A further strength of Silent Warfare is its ability to challenge the reader into making up 
his own mind on certain issues by presenting many possible theories, or by discussing 
both the pros and cons, without imposing a definitive truth. For example, the last chapter, 
"Toward a Theory of Intelligence," despite being the shortest, is probably the most 
thought-provoking as it directly addresses the question of what intelligence is. Although 
that chapter could have easily been entitled, "A Discussion of Sherman Kent's Strategic 
Intelligence for American World Policy," it is rich in interesting questions and hypotheses 
on what intelligence really means and whether it should be seen as a science in itself. 
Some previous book reviews have mentioned the somewhat American ethnocentric bias 
to the evidence presented by the authors, but that arguable bias is not detrimental to the 
overall quality of the book nor is it a hidden bias, the preface stating clearly that Silent 
Warfare, written by two Americans, was born out of a course taught at the University of 
Chicago and that "many of the examples found in the book are drawn from the British 
and American intelligence experiences." (p. vii) In fact, the authors seem to have put a lot 
of effort into remaining as objective as possible, hence the textbook style and structure. 
On a few rare occasions they do, however, seem to take a position, such as when 
presenting arguments in favour of human intelligence over technological means of 
intelligence- gathering (pp. 33-37), or when pointing out that much of the criticism 
directed against covert actions would have been more properly directed against the 
foreign policy they served. (p. 146) 
Another very interesting section of Silent Warfare is the 12-page discussion on 
"Intelligence Failure and Surprise." The authors discuss the distinction between types and 
causes of failure and also present so-called "solutions" to the problem of intelligence 
failure. (pp. 69-73) True to their academic approach, Shulsky and Schmitt start by 
defining the term failure before exploring possible solutions, either institutional 
(establishing a devil's advocate agency) or intellectual (improving thought processes). 
They end the section by drawing our attention to the mirror-imaging error under which, 
for example, American intelligence analysts are, for cultural reasons, deemed more likely 
than other analysts to understand and predict the actions of others on the basis of what 
they would do under similar circumstances. (p. 73) Had the book been written after 11 
September 2001, the authors could have easily gone one step further to suggest that such 
a mirror-imaging error was responsible for the intelligence failure behind the attacks, as 
American analysts were unable to imagine how someone could possibly board a plane 
and fly it into a building, and failed to consider that many terrorists do not think like 
Americans and do not give their life the same value or importance. 
Despite the fact that it would have been greatly enhanced by the inclusion of a 
bibliography, Silent Warfare is without a doubt today's standard for those wanting to 
understand or be introduced to the world of intelligence. It provides neophytes with an 
easily readable introduction into that world, and experienced practitioners and academics 
with a well-structured, comprehensive treatise to serve as an essential reference tool. But 
given the current international situation and the important place that intelligence has 
taken since September 2001, Silent Warfare should be a mandatory read for anyone 
wishing to debate or criticize intelligence operations, agencies, or policies. 
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